FIP-0005 Source

TitleRemove ineffective reward vesting
AuthorAlex North, @Zenground

Spec Sections

FIP-0005: Remove ineffective reward vesting

Simple Summary

Remove the processing of miner reward vesting from PreCommitSector and ConfirmSectorProofsValid, because it’s expensive and doesn’t achieve much.


Remove expensive calculation of miner reward vesting from the PreCommitSector and ConfirmSectorProofsValid methods, leaving it to the deadline cron. This will reduce the gas consumption of these methods substantially, freeing up chain bandwidth and reducing costs.

Change Motivation

Chain bandwidth is a valuable resource, necessary for both critical network operations and product use. Avoiding frequent and high-gas-cost operations reduces contention, costs, and chain validation latency.

Processing reward vesting is quite expensive as it loads and stores a sizeable array for the vesting table. For high-scale miners, committing many sectors per deadline (or even per-epoch), this represents a sizeable portion of total gas cost and chain bandwidth consumption.


Remove the invocations of State.UnlockVestedFunds from PreCommitSector and ConfirmSectorProofsValid.

Design Rationale

Reward vesting is computed via State.UnlockVestedFunds, which is called from PreCommitSector, ConfirmSectorProofsValid, WithdrawBalance and the deadline cron handler. The original motivation for computing vesting on sector commitment is so that any vested funds could be used for the pre-commit deposit or pledge.

The vesting table is quantized to 12-hr increments. Since vesting is processed in the deadline cron every 30 minutes regardless, a call during sector commitment almost always achieves nothing. The most it could achieve is to accelerate a release by 30 minutes.

A miner operator wishing to process vesting manually, ahead of the per-deadline cron call, could do so by calling WithdrawFunds with an amount of zero. Such a call would require use of the miner’s Owner address.

Backwards Compatibility

This change must be implemented along with an increment to the runtime’s network version number. It will only take effect after a designated upgrade epoch.

This proposal does not require changes to the state schema of any actor, nor method parameter or return values.

Test Cases


Security Considerations


Incentive Considerations

This proposal changes incentives only marginally.

It may delay the use of recently-vested rewards for new pre-commit deposits or pledges, leading to incentive to hold slightly more working balance in a miner actor. Similarly, it may incentivize use of the WithdrawFunds method in order to accelerate the release of vested funds.

Product Considerations

This proposal will decrease contention for chain transaction throughput, generally making use of the Filecoin blockchain cheaper.


Implemented in specs-actors in, introduced to the network in Lotus v1.2.0 at epoch 265200.

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.


Please cite this document as:

Alex North, @Zenground, "FIP-0005: Remove ineffective reward vesting," Filecoin Improvement Proposals, no. 0005, October 2020. [Online serial]. Available: